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•	 At	 present,	 Kazakhstan	 is	 heading	 towards	 a	 multifaceted	
crisis:	social,	economic	and	political.	The	crisis	has	been	ad-
ditionally	accelerated	by	external	factors	independent	of	the	














destabilisation	 triggered	 by	 socio-economic	 factors,	 through	






















Nazarbayev.	To	 counteract	 this,	 a	 reconstruction	of	 the	 sys-
tem,	 a	 kind	 of	 perestroika	 initiated	 by	 Nazarbayev	 himself,	


















ing	 frustration	 among	 the	 public,	 distrust	 towards	 the	 gov-























ing	 them.	 If	 the	reforms	are	carried	out,	 this	will	break	 the	





the	 risk	 of	 destabilisation	 in	Kazakhstan	 in	 the	 short	 term.	




ed	 in	 the	system’s	survival)	generated	by	 the	reforms	 them-
selves.	 Therefore,	 the	 perestroika initiated	 by	 Nazarbayev	 is	




















i. analysis of the challenges  



















The	 challenges	 Kazakhstan	 is	 facing	 are	 nothing	 new,	 but	 the	
need	to	resolve	them	is	becoming	urgent	due	to	unfavourable	ex-
ternal	factors	and	the	growing	risk	of	destabilisation	linked	to	the	
economic	downturn	 in	 the	country.	Weak	points	 in	 the	present	
model	of	the	state’s	operation,	defects	in	the	policy	which	shapes	
society	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 economic	 transformation	 are	
becoming	obvious.	Challenges	linked	to	the	country’s	geopolitical	
situation	are	gaining	significance.	
1. Nazarbayev – the strength and the weakness of the 
political system











































































sible	upheaval	 (the	 symptoms	of	 a	 crisis	 appearing	 on	 the	 local	








In	practice,	 the	system	functions	 this	way:	Nazarbayev	sets	 the	
priorities	 in	 his	 annual	 address	 to	 the	 nation	 or	 in	 the	 reform	
plan,	and	these	must	then	be	implemented	(and	to	a	certain	ex-




































This	means	 that	 the	 state	governance	system	 is	 in	 fact	 reminis-













its	negative	 consequences	 include	 the	 exemption	of	 government	
representatives	from	accountability	to	the	public	(they	only	report	
to	Nazarbayev).	As	a	result,	the	effectiveness	of	state	institutions	
















































which	would	unite	 the	public	with	 the	political	 system	and	 the	
elite	 (as	 is	 the	 case	with	Turkmenistan).	This	means	 that	when	





riots	or	 the refusal	of	akims to	subordinate	themselves	to	a	new	
















































































the	 changes	which	 have	 taken	 place	 in	Kazakhstan	 since	 it	 re-
gained	independence.	
Changes	in	the	country’s	ethnic	composition	are	among	the	most	
important	processes	 that	have	had	an	 impact	on	 the	 condition	




aimed	 at	 repatriating	 ethnic	 Kazakhs	 from	 the	 neighbouring	
countries,	so-called	oralman15,	the	higher	birth	rate	among	ethnic	






































tion	 policies	 of	 the	 states	which	 the	 emigrants	 had	 originated	




















































their	 role	 in	 the	 country	as	 that	 of	 ‘first	 amongst	 equals’,	while	
ethnic	 Russians	 (and	 other	 Slavonic	 minorities)	 feel	 marginal-
ised20	 and	mention	 that	 it	 is	 their	 ancestors	 who	 defended	 the	
USSR	and	Kazakhstan	(during	World	War	II,	which	is	called	the	
Great	Patriotic	War	in	the	post-Soviet	area)	and	who	built	it.	The	








































been	 intensifying,	 and	 there	 are	 informal	 Kazakh	 and	Russian	














the	 Kazakh-speaking	 population24	 –	 in	 2009,	 74%	 of	 population	
declared	they	understood	Kazakh,	and	62%	were	fluent	users	of	






cast	 TV	 programmes	 in	 this	 language	 (over	 53%	 of	 TV	 content	
must	be	in	Kazakh)	up	to	symbolic	elements,	for	example,	using	
22	 Ethnic	minorities	 in	Kazakhstan	have	no	guaranteed	representatives	 in	
other	institutions	except	the	Assembly.	In	turn,	the	Assembly	elects	nine	
members	of	the	lower	house	of	parliament.	
23	 For	 example,	 https://meduza.io/news/2014/10/20/ust-kamenogorskaya-
narodnaya-respublika








































































ties	 existing	 among	 ethnic	 Kazakhs.	 These	 are	 regional	 differ-





arena	 for	mutual	discord	between	Kazakhs	 from	 the	 south	and	















































cannot	 speak	 the	 Kazakh	 language	 (unlike	 nagyz-Kazakh	 who	
knows	his	native	 language).	The	conflict	over	 language	issues	 is	








who	 have	 been	 brought	 up	 in	 an	 independent	Kazakhstan	 ver-
sus	 the	 representatives	of	 the	Soviet	 school.	The	differing	goals	
of	 the	 regional	 elites	 complicates	 the	 situation	 further.	 Add	 to	
this	the	government’s	fear	of	ethnic	conflicts,	Islamic	radicalism,	
disintegration	of	the	state	and	separatism.	However,	in	practice,	
Nazarbayev’s	 regime	 has	 been	 quite	 successful	 at	 dealing	 with	

































from	 a	 given	 region.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 citizens	 are	more	 and	
more	attached	to	the	idea	of	Kazakhstan’s	statehood,	but	it	does	
not	play	the	consolidating	function	at	present	because	its	signifi-















3. The economic model that boosts social aspirations
The	economic	model	adopted	by	Nazarbayev	envisages	a	partial	
liberalisation	of	the	economy	and	opening	the	country	up	to	for-























from	US$94	 to	US$346	 (average	monthly	wages	 from	US$208	 to	
US$675)37.	At	the	same	time,	the	proportion	of	the	population	liv-






































































































Employees	 of	 Uzenmunaigaz	 (a	 company	 operating	 on	 the	
Zhanaozen	field	 in	 the	western	 part	 of	 the	 country	 close	 to	
the	border	with	Turkmenistan)	controlled	by	the	state-owned	
holding	 Samruk-Kazyna	 went	 on	 strike	 in	 2011.	 The	 strike	
lasted	 from	 spring	 to	December	 2011	 and	 ended	 in	 a	 violent	
pacification	 during	 which	 15	 people	 were	 killed.	 Riots	 also	
spilled	 over	 to	 other	 places	 in	 the	 region;	 for	 example,	 one	
more	person	was	killed	 in	Shetpe.	Zhanaozen	 is	an	 illustra-
tion	of	Kazakhstan’s	most	serious	problems:	
	– the	 public’s	 demanding	 attitude:	 the	 workers	 went	 on	
strike	 because	 they	wanted	 a	 pay	 rise,	 guarantees	 of	 the	

























demned,	 for	example,	 in	 the	nearby	city	of	Aktau,	whose	
residents	 believed	 that	 the	 workers	 already	 earned	 good	
money	and	were	demanding	 too	much;	 after	 the	 tragedy,	
families	 of	 the	 victims	 and	 others	 harmed	 by	 the	 events	
competed	for	damages	from	the	state,	not	stopping	short	of	
mutual	accusations;	
	– problems	 with	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	 Kazakh	 immigrant	
population:	 residents	 of	Zhanaozen	were	 ethnic	Kazakhs	
who	had	 come,	 for	 example,	 from	Turkmenistan	 and	Uz-
bekistan	 (the	 oralman).	 The	 city’s	 population	 doubled	 be-
tween	2000	and	2010.	The	 returnees	were	 treated	by	 the	
residents	of	the	region	as	immigrants,	aliens;	







quences	 of	 the	 developments	 in	 Zhanaozen	 included	 the	



































4. The challenges on the international arena
The	 ever	 more	 complicated	 international	 environment	 is	 a	 re-
sult	of	the	changing	global	balance	of	forces	and	also	affects	the	
situation	 in	Central	Asia	 and	Kazakhstan	 itself.	 It	 provides	 the	
backdrop	for	a	crisis	looming	on	the	horizon.	From	Astana’s	point	







an	 ostentatious	 openness	 to	 co-operation	with	 all	willing	 part-
ners42.	 President	 Nazarbayev	 has	 for	 years	 formulated	 foreign	

















































































































































a	 common	 historical	 legacy,	 and	 shared	 pro-state	 values.	 Thus	
































velopment	 in	 the	West	 (for	example,	 through	co-operation	with	
the	OECD	and	the	EU)	as	Eastern	Asian	states	have	done	before	
them.	 In	 fact,	 the	 strategy	being	currently	 implemented	by	Ka-
zakhstan	 envisages	 breaking	 the	mental	 bonds	with	 the	 Soviet	
era	and	puts	it	at	risk	of	conflict	with	Russia.	
1. Reinforcing the state institutions
Improving	the	operation	of	state	institutions	is	at	the	core	of	the	
reforms	 currently	being	 implemented.	Three	 out	 of	 the	five	 so-
called	‘institutional	reforms’49	announced	in	March	this	year	and	




the	 state’s	 responsibility	 towards	 its	 citizens.	Another	objective	























operate	 efficiently	 regardless	 of	 who	 governs	 the	 country	 and	
how.	 Streamlining	 the	 operation	 of	 institutions	 is	 expected	 to	






tion	 of	 legislative	 solutions	 recommended	 by	Western	 interna-
tional	 organisations	 as	 long	 as	 it	 does	not	 directly	 threaten	 the	
authoritarian	 regime.	 In	 this	 context,	 Kazakhstan’s	 moves	 are	
reminiscent	of	the	situation	in	South	Korea	in	1960-1980.	
The	changes	envisage	introducing:	a	new	multi-stage	system	for	












another	 managerial	 position	 can	 take	 only	 one	 employee	 with	
them.	A	public	administration	unit	is	to	be	created	at	the	Agency	




























duced	role	 for	 the	public	prosecutor	 in	civil	cases.	Special	 focus	
will	be	put	on	economic	courts	which	consider	cases	concerning	
investors.	 A	 specialist	 economic	 court	 attached	 to	 the	 Supreme	
Court	is	to	be	established,	and	a	court	of	arbitration,	modelled	on	

































































































minor	conflicts	on	 the	 lower	 levels,	 thus	protecting	 the	govern-
ment	and	preventing	crises	 from	erupting	However,	 this	would	





















































































reason	why	 Nazarbayev	 has	 recommended	 amendments	 to	 the	
civil	service	act	that	will	force	the	dismissals	of	public	servants	
of	pensionable	age.	The	 state	apparatus	 is	 likely	 to	obstruct	 the	
changes	in	order	to	maintain	for	as	long	as	possible	the	benefits	
of	the	corrupt	practices	used	so	far.	This	will	be	counteracted	by	
the	 Agency	 for	 Civil	 Service	 Affairs	 and	 Fighting	 Corruption57,	
which	reports	directly	to	the	president.	The	country’s	difficult	fi-
nancial	situation	will	generate	tension	among	the	elite	and	also	
make	 economising	 on	 expenses	 necessary,	 and	 public	 pressure	
will	contribute	to	this58.	
It	is	too	early	to	make	a	conclusive	evaluation	of	the	effects	of	the	


























































































moves	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	 independence.	What	 is	 new	 is	
its	 intensification	 in	the	face	of	Russia’s	actions:	 the	annexation	
of	Crimea	and	the	creation	of	separatism	in	eastern	Ukraine.	The	
numerous	 statements	 from	 Russian	 politicians	 questioning	 the	
meaning	of	Kazakhstan’s	existence	in	its	present	form	have	also	
acted	as	a	stimulant.	Other	concepts	and	notions	used	by	the	gov-
ernment	 are	 imprecise	 (e.g.	 ecology,	 tolerance,	 the	Kazakh	 lan-





practical	 level	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 Russian	 narrative	 (the	 anti-
Chinese	narrative	 and	 stoking	anti-Chinese	phobias	 existing	 in	
society	were	much	more	important	a	few	years	ago),	even	though	
on	 the	 political	 level	 Kazakhstan	 has	 consistently	 emphasised	





stan	it	 is	 the	government	elite	 (especially	 its	younger	members,	












































one	 nation,	 one	 destiny’	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 nations	
from	all	over	the	Soviet	Union	were	exiled	to	Kazakhstan	in	the	
Soviet	era	and	met	with	hospitality65,	and	that	Kazakhs	fought	on	
the	 fronts	of	World	War	 II	 to	 the	same	extent	as	Russians	did66.	















































The	 historical	 memory	 policy	 which	 has	 been	 activated	 over	
the	 past	 few	years	 also	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 building	 the	
bond	 between	 the	Kazakh	 public	 and	 their	 state.	 It	 is	 intended	
to	 emphasise	 its	 distinctness	 through	 the	 search	 for	 old	 roots	























































































try.	This	boils	down	 to	encouraging	ethnic	Kazakhs	 to	 settle	 in	
the	northern	part	of	the	country,	for	example	as	part	of	the	Ser-
pen	programme,	a	scholarship	offer	addressed	to	 the	overpopu-


































ernment74).	 The	 government	 has	 not	 hindered	 Russia’s	 scholar-
ship	policy	in	Kazakhstan,	but	this	is	happening	at	a	cost,	leading,	
for	 example,	 to	 the	 so-called	 ‘brain	drain’,	which	 also	 concerns	
ethnic	Kazakhs.	



































































devaluation	of	 the	 tenge	worsened	the	financial	situation	of	 the	
Kazakh	public	and	led	to	a	withdrawal	from	the	previous	policy	
of	minimising	the	social	costs	of	the	reforms	(especially,	after	the	



















protests.	 The	 devaluation	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	 discontinu-











airports,	 railways	 and	 a	whole	 array	 of	 smaller	 companies,	 in-
cluding	 local	media.	 Its	goal	 is	 to	reduce	the	state’s	share	 in	 the	
economy	and	 to	boost	 competition.	The	privatisation	 is	 also	 ex-
pected	to	help	build	an	 international	financial	centre	 in	Astana	
modelled	on	Dubai:	 its	working	 language	will	 be	English	 and	 it	
will	operate	according	to	British	law.	
Solutions	liberalising	some	sectors	which	regulate	the	function-




























At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 government	has	 decided	 to	 apply	 the	 old	

















a	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 reforms.	 WTO	
membership	will	boost	competition	and	will	decrease	the	import	
tariffs	on	a	number	of	products	to	a	level	that	applied	before	the	




























sequences	 of	 the	 reforms,	 for	 example,	 temporary	discounts	 on	
railway	services	and	electricity	for	the	private	sector,	three-year	
memoranda	 guaranteeing	 the	 purchase	 of	 products	 from	 state-
owned	plants	or	price	controls	on	socially	sensitive	goods	out	of	
fear	 of	 people’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 deterioration	 of	 their	 financial	







tion,	 are	medium-term	and	will	 be	 implemented	 in	 the	 coming	







4. Institutionalisation of co-operation with the West as 












































Kazakhstan’s	 traditional	 way	 to	 balance	 Russia’s	 influence	 has	
been	to	open	up	to	the	other	large	player	present	in	the	region—































economic	 partner,	 is	 intended	 to	mitigate	Moscow’s	 aspirations	




















in	 the	 broader	 meaning	 of	 the	 term.	 Signing	 the	 co-operation	
agreement	with	the	OECD	in	January	2015	and	the	ambitious	goal	
to	 join	 the	 world’s	 30	 best-developed	 nations	 were	 intended	 to	
serve	the	same	goal83.	
Given	 the	 principle	 of	 avoiding	 provoking	Russia,	 Kazakhstan’s	





















maintaining	 its	 autonomous	 position	 where	 possible.	 For	 this	
reason	its	adjustment	is	barely	visible	at	first	sight	–	Kazakhstan	
itself	 has	 defined	 Russia	 as	 its	 strategic	 partner	 since	 the	 very	
beginning	 of	 its	 independence.	However,	 since	 the	 internation-
al	 context	 around	Kazakhstan	has	 changed,	 the	 government	 in	
Astana	has	to	cope	with	the	challenge	of	continuing	its	previous	
multidimensional	 foreign	 policy.	 Given	 the	 present	 geopolitical	
































iii. conclusions and possible developMents
Kazakhstan	 is	an	exceptional	 case	among	 the	post-Soviet	 coun-
tries.	 Although	 it	 is	 an	 authoritarian	 state,	 it	 has	 been	 able	 to	
diagnose	 a	 systemic	 crisis	 and	 reach	 out	 to	 modern	 and	 risky	





tion	 to	 its	 problems,	 rather	 than	 tightening	 the	 authoritarian	
grip.	Paradoxically,	the	changes	have	been	introduced	by	way	of	
soft	authoritarian	methods,	while	their	possible	implementation	





struction	 of	 the	 elements	which	 are	 of	 key	 significance	 for	 the	




out	 to	new	models	 of	development	which	do	not	 carry	 the	bur-





light	of	 the	Soviet	Union	better	 than	anyone	else.	By	 launching	
a	similar	project	in	Kazakhstan,	he	is	betting	everything	on	one	
card,	probably	because	he	 is	convinced	 that	 the	state	 in	 its	pre-
sent	shape	is	too	weak	to	withstand	Russian	imperialism	and	the	
































in	 the	 modernisation	 processes	 while	 their	 financial	 condition	
worsens,	as	well	as	by	the	divides	existing	in	society.	
As	regards	 the	 international	context,	Russia’s	policy	will	be	 the	
most	 important	 factor	 for	 Kazakhstan’s	 further	 development.	
Over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 this	 has	 become	 increasingly	 aggres-
sive	 and	 unpredictable.	 The	way	 the	Kremlin	 sets	 its	 priorities	
as	part	of	 its	reconquista	 of	 ‘Russian	 land’	will	decide	on	 the	 fu-
ture	of	Kazakhstan.	The	risk	of	intervention	from	Russia	(at	the	
political	level	or	through	provocations	inside	Kazakhstan)	is	in-
creasing	 during	 the	 succession	 process.	 It	 cannot	 be	 ruled	 out	
that	Nazarbayev’s	double	game	is	viewed	by	Moscow	(and	Putin	
himself)	as	an	obstacle	to	drawing	Kazakhstan	closer	to	Russia.	




















Perestroika	 in	Kazakhstan	 is	 a	 risky	 solution.	 If	 some	of	 the	an-
nounced	 changes	 are	 introduced,	 the	 existing	 mechanisms	 of	
the	 state’s	 operation	may	 collapse	 and	 cause	 internal	 chaos.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 strengthening	 the	 authoritarian	 regime	would	
lead	to	Kazakhstan	being	more	and	more	strongly	overshadowed	
by	Russia’s	political	and	social	influence,	as	has	been	happening	















nationalist	 tendencies	 and	 the	myth	 of	 Kazakhstan	 created	 by	
Nazarbayev	will	impede	the	process	of	digesting	Kazakhstan	and	
the	reconquista of	Central	Asia.	
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